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COURT OF APPEALS, 1955 TERM
Zoning
A zoning ordinance may not impose restrictions upon property which
are not necessary for the public health, safety, convenience or general wel-
fare.2 2 However, where reliance is placed upon such a statute, the party so
relying cannot also attack it as being unconstitutional 2 3 The only grounds
of attack in such a situation are that the statute was unconstitutionally ap-
plied 2 4
In Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Board23 and in Community Syn-
agogue v. Bates,2G the question of the application of zoning ordinances to
religious bodies was before the Court of Appeals. In each case petitioner had
applied to its respective zoning board for building permits as required by
statute. In the Diocese of Rochester case the application was denied on the
grounds that property values in the area would diminish, there would be
decreased enjoyment of neighbbring property, there would be loss of tax
revenue and that the presence of a church and school in a residential area
would create traffic hazards. In the Community Synagogue case, the applica-
tion was denied on the grounds that the statute allowed only buildings to
be used for a strictly religious purpose, that this would not include a building
to be used for social gatherings and meetings and that the granting of the
application would not promote health, safety, convenience or welfare of the
public. The Court held, reversing the Appellate Division in both instances, 2 7
that the denials of the respective boards were arbitrary and unreasonable
and were therefore an abuse of discretion.
In the review of a determination by an administrative body, a court may
not base its decision upon the personal feelings of the members thereof.28 It
may only interfere where such determination was arbitrary and capricious.2,
Since churches and religious organizations contribute to the general welfare
of society it would be patently unconstitutional for a zoning board io exclude
them from a residential area altogether or to impose restrictions of any nature
without reason. Therefore it would seen that the effect of churches, schools
22. North Shore Unitarian Soc. v1. Village of Plandome, 200 Misc. 524, 109
N. Y. S. 2d 803 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
-23. Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U. S. 245 (1947); Shepherd v. Mount Vernon Trust
Co., 269 N. Y. 234, 199 N. E. 201 (1935).
24. Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U. S. 1 (1943); Zorack v. Clauson, 303 N. Y. 161
100 N. E. 2d 463 (1951), aff'd., 343 U. S. 306 (1952).
25. 1 N. Y. 2d 508,7136 N. E. 2d 827 (1956).
26. 1 N. Y. 2d.445, 136 N. E. 2d 488 (1956).
27. Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Board, 1 A. D. 2d 86, 147 N.-Y. S.-2d
392 (4th Dep't 1955); Community Synagogue v. Bates, 1 A.- D. 2d 686, 147. N. Y. S.
2d 204 (2d Dep't 1955).
28. Rodgers v. Village of Terrytown, 302 N. Y. 115, 96 N. E. 2d 731 (1951).
29. People ex rel. Hudson-Harlem Valley Title & Nortga.qe QQ, v. Walker,
282 N. Y. 400, 26 N. E. 2d 952 (1940). --
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and other buildings used for religious purposes upon neighboring property
would be an insufficient basis to deny an application for a building permit
since such buildings would have the same effect in any residential area.
It has been held that an administrative board may not apply any standards
which are not declared by the statutes authorizing their existence, hence an
increase in traffic in the area would not be a valid basis for denial of a build-
ing permit.30 The state has declared a policy of encouraging religious organi-
zations by exempting from taxation all property used exclusively for such
purposes3' and thus has demonstrated its preference for religious organizations
over potential taxes. It would be somewhat illogical, therefore, to base a
denial of a building permit upon the grounds of loss of tax revenue.
It has been generally considered that the term church or religious build-
ing includes all buildings connected with the general religious purpose.32 This
would include meeting halls, schools and the like. As pointed out in the
opinions, a church is more than a place of worship - it is a meeting place
for members of a religious faith and a place of education in the dogma of
the particular denomination. Therefore a denial of the right to provide for
these purposes is no .more justified than a denial of permission to build the
church itself.
The Court was undoubtedly correct in its holdings. Since the, denials
of. the applications were based upon a rationale which has been demonstrated
as not being within the discretion of a zoning board, the decisions can not bq
said to be a substitution of the Court's opinion for that of the administrative
body. 33
Fair and Reasonable Rental
Under the Emergency Business Space Rent Control Law 34 in force in
New York City, a landlord who is not receiving a reasonable return on his
investment may proceed to have his tenant's rent increased by applying to
the Supreme Court or submitting to arbitration.35. A reasonable return is pre-
30. Small v. Moss, 279 N. Y. 288, 18 N. E. 2d 281 (1938).
31. N.,Y. TAX LAW §4 The following property shall be exempt from taxation:
(6) The real property of a corporation or association organized exclusively for ...
religious ... purposes ....
32. Young Women's Christian Assn. v. City of New York, 217 App. Div. 406,
216 N. Y. Supp. 248 (1926), aff'd., 245 N. Y. 562, 157 N. E. 858 (1927).
33. The dissent in both cases was to the effect that the decision was pre-
mature in that the better procedure-would be to attack the constitutionality of
the statutes in 'a separate proceeding. While this might be more "orderly" and
was the procedure used in Concordia Collegiate Inst. v. Miller, 301 N. Y. 189, 93
N. E. 2d 632 (1950), it does not seem that it is a matter of crucial importance.
,34., M CKINNEY'S UNCONSOL LAwS, §§8551 et seq.
35. M CKINNEY$S UNCONSOL LAWs, §8554.
